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Abstract 
Cash retention is a common means of protecting an employer from a contractor’s insolvency 
as well as ensuring that contractors finish the work that they start.  Similarly, contractors 
withhold part of payments due to their sub-contractors.  Larger contracts tend to be subjected 
to smaller rates of retention.  By calculating the cost of retention as an amount per year of a 
contract, it is shown that retention is far more expensive for firms whose work consists of 
short contracts.  The extra cost is multiplied when the final payment is delayed, as it often is 
for those whose work takes place at the beginning of a project.  This may explain why it is 
that main contractors are a lot less interested than sub-contractors in alternatives to cash 
retention, such as retention bonds. 
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Introduction 
Most construction contracts are subject to cash retention (Hughes et al. 1998). This means 
that whenever a payment is made to a contractor by an employer, a small proportion is kept 
back.  This proportion is usually in the region of 3 to 5% (see for example, (Joint Contracts 
Tribunal 1998)).  The primary purpose of this retention is to provide a fund for the employer 
in the event that the contractor fails to perform because of insolvency.  A secondary purpose 
is to motivate the contractor to complete any minor outstanding items and repair defects after 
the work is finished. 
Usually, half of the retention is released when the project reaches “practical completion” or 
“substantial completion”, an event which is commonly identified in construction contracts 
and defined as the point at which the work is completed for all practical purposes and any 
remaining defects are trivial.  One characteristic of this event is that it marks the 
commencement of the “defects liability period” (DLP), usually of six months.  Certain defects 
(defined in the contract) which occur or are noticed during this period may be entered in a list 
of defects (snagging list) which will be presented to the contractor at (or shortly after) the end 
of the period so that the contractor can put them right at his own expense.  Once this is done, 
the remainder of the retention is released (Murdoch and Hughes 1996). 
Standard form contracts, such as those published by the UK’s Joint Contracts Tribunal (Joint 
Contracts Tribunal 1998), recommend that retention is set at 5%, unless the contract value is 
high, in which case a lower rate should be used.  This seems to make sense, because on large 
projects retention can amount to a large sum.  However, further analysis of the impact of cash 
retention on the finances of construction firms, especially sub-contractors, reveals a different 
picture.  This is important as nearly all construction work is sub-contracted (Hughes et al. 
1997). 
Calculating the annual equivalent cost of retention 
Recent research (Hughes et al. 1998) considered the purposes, uses and costs of various kinds 
of financial protection in construction (bonds, retentions, guarantees, etc.).  That research 
considered the full range of options available to those entering into construction contracts, 
assessing the uses, merits and costs of each.  As part of the research, we interviewed 
practitioners, ran five focus groups, each representing different interests within the industry, 
conducted and analysed a postal survey which produced approximately 200 responses and 
analysed financial information supplied by Dun and Bradstreet on over 5,000 construction 
companies in the UK. Among other things, the research revealed that the median rate for 
retention was 3% and ranged from 1 to 15%.  Cash retention is not the only means of 
providing financial protection to those who employ contractors or sub-contractors.  One 
commonly sought alternative is a retention bond, another is a parent company guarantee. In 
comparing the relative costs of alternative financial protection arrangements, it was found 
necessary to bring the various kinds of mechanism to a common base.  The basis chosen for 
comparing different arrangements was the cost per year of the contract.  The operation of the 
retention mechanism is an opportunity cost to the contractor or sub-contractor, equivalent to 
the loss of interest on the amount of money withheld.  This has to be balanced against income 
for the duration of the contract work.  In making these comparisons (reported in Hughes et al. 
1998), it became clear that differing arrangements for cash retention had very different 
impacts on the cost to the contractor (or sub-contractor).  In particular, withholding the final 
release of retention for long periods adds an excessive burden to those whose work takes 
place early in the project. 
During the course of the contract, the amount withheld increases as the value of work done 
increases.  At the beginning of the work, none is withheld, at the end, the full amount of 
retention is withheld.  Although the work does not progress linearly (an ‘S’-curve is 
characteristic of the way that construction work progresses), for the purposes of calculating 
the interest on the amount of money retained, and the period for which it is held, a straight 
line is a good approximation.  The period for which the monies are outstanding varies slightly 
with the shape of the ‘S’ curve, influencing the loss of interest on retention. However, this is 
insignificant in comparison to the impact of the duration of the DLP, especially in relation to 
its duration relative to the contract period.  The size of the retention fund averages out to an 
amount that is approximately equal to half of the retention for the period of the contract: 
 dr ×
2
 .................................................. (1) 
where r is the rate of retention (%) and d is the duration of the contract (months). 
At the point of practical completion, half of the retention is released, and the remaining half is 
held until the end of the defects liability period: 
 pr ×
2
.................................................. (2) 
where  p is the duration of the defects liability period (months).   Adding eqn 1 to eqn. 2: 
 ( )pdr +×
2
 ............................................. (3) 
This gives the total amount that is withheld from the contractor.  However, the contractor has 
to finance this from income earned only during the contract period, d, so the annual 
equivalent is calculated by dividing eqn. (3) by d: 
 ( )
d
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×
2
 ............................................. (4) 
To illustrate this, Figure 1 shows an example arrangement where 5%  retention runs for the 
period of a twelve month contract.  At practical completion (12 months), half of the retention 
is released and 6 months later, the remainder is released.   Thus, a contract that earns income 
for 12 months involves retention which approximates to 2.5% (half the rate of retention) for 
18 months (the duration of the project plus the defects liability period), giving an annual 
equivalent of 2.5 x 18/12, i.e. 3.75%.   
The use of retention in practice 
During the research (Hughes et al. 1998), it became clear that retention may be withheld for 
very long periods, especially on sub-contracts, even of relatively small value.  In addition, 
sometimes, main contractors pay late or even do not pay at all.  The longest periods are 
usually experienced by those sub-contractors whose work is early in the process, such as 
piling sub-contractors.  It is quite common for the final release of retention to sub-contractors 
to be tied to the main contractor’s final payment date.  The research showed that in practice 
such sub-contractors may be kept waiting for 2.5% of their money for perhaps two years after 
they have finished their work.  If this is reduced to the cost per month of contract, an 
interesting pattern emerges.  Table 1 illustrates some different scenarios for cash retention, all 
of which are routinely encountered in practice.  For the purposes of illustration, a rate of 
retention of 5% has been assumed in the formula given at (4).  The data in columns 2 to 4 of 
the data are calculated from the formula, and these are converted to a cost, assuming a rate of 
interest, or opportunity cost, of 6% p.a., in columns 5 to 7. 
In calculating the cost to the contractor, it seems that the cost of retention to the contractor is 
more for short projects than for long ones.  This is because of the fact that half of the 
retention is held for (typically) six months after practical completion.  On a short project, this 
six-month period has a much bigger impact than on a longer one.  Table 1 shows why this is 
so and Figure 2 displays the same data.  Here, the impact of varying the duration of the 
defects liability period is clear, especially in relation to shorter contract periods.   
Current views on retention 
Since the Latham Report (Latham 1994) there have been numerous calls in the UK to find 
alternatives to cash retention (Construction News 1997, Cook 1997, Klein 1997, Latham 
1997).  One reason for dissatisfaction with retention funds is the uncertainty that surrounds 
the status of a sub-contractor’s retention in the event of main contractor insolvency 
(McCartney 1992, Powell-Smith 1991).  The problem here is that if the main contractor goes 
insolvent during a project, it is very difficult for sub-contractors to obtain the funds held by 
the main contractor as retention, unless special arrangements have been made (Huxtable 
1992).  The usual proposal for overcoming this problem is a retention bond, where a 
contractor (or sub-contractor) would find bank or insurer to guarantee their solvency for the 
duration of the project (Latham 1997).  While popular among sub-contractors because of the 
appeal of being paid 100% of the work certified as finished each month, these calls have 
largely been resisted by main contractors, primarily because they would be out of pocket if 
they sought retention bonds from their sub-contractors when they face cash retention on their 
own receipts (in this situation they would have to pay their sub-contractors 100% of the value 
of the work done even though they were not receiving 100% of the value of the work done 
from their employers). 
Retention remains the main mechanism for protecting the employer within standard forms of 
building contract (see, for example JCT 80, Joint Contracts Tribunal 1998).  Indeed, the fact 
is that standard form contracts like JCT 80 include a footnote to the effect that on larger 
contracts, lower rates of retention may be used, indicating that those who negotiate and draft 
standard forms believe the impact to be less for shorter contracts, justifying a higher 
percentage rate of retention 
Conclusions 
The analysis in Table 1 explains why the issue is so much more important for sub-contractors 
working on short contracts at the outset of a project.  These sub-contractors frequently have to 
await completion of the entire project before their final account is settled, placing them at the 
expensive end of the line in Figure 2, whereas main contractors and those sub-contractors 
whose work is at the end of the project will find that the cost of retention is marginal.  
Although this phenomenon is most marked on short sub-contracts with long delays to the 
final payment, the situation is typified by piling sub-contracts, which are encountered on most 
large projects.  Moreover, the notion that retention should be at a lower rate for large projects 
seems to ignore the greater impact that cash retention has on the cash flow of those firms 
whose work consists of small projects. 
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Figure 2: Cost of various retention arrangements per year of contract
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Figure 1: How the amount of the retention fund changes during a contract 
 
  
 
Table 1: Calculation of annual equivalent cost of various retention arrangements 
 Annual equivalent rate of retention 
per year of contract (%) 
 Annual equivalent rate per year of 
contract (%) 
Duration of 
contract 
(months) 
6 months 
DLP 
12 months 
DLP 
24 months 
DLP 
 6 months 
DLP 
12 months 
DLP 
24 months 
DLP 
3 7.50 12.50 22.50  0.45 0.75 1.35 
6 5.00 7.50 12.50  0.30 0.45 0.75 
9 4.17 5.83 9.17  0.25 0.35 0.55 
12 3.75 5.00 7.50  0.23 0.30 0.45 
15 3.50 4.50 6.50  0.21 0.27 0.39 
18 3.33 4.17 5.83  0.20 0.25 0.35 
21 3.21 3.93 5.36  0.19 0.24 0.32 
24 3.13 3.75 5.00  0.19 0.23 0.30 
27 3.06 3.61 4.72  0.18 0.22 0.28 
30 3.00 3.50 4.50  0.18 0.21 0.27 
33 2.95 3.41 4.32  0.18 0.20 0.26 
36 2.92 3.33 4.17  0.18 0.20 0.25 
39 2.88 3.27 4.04  0.17 0.20 0.24 
42 2.86 3.21 3.93  0.17 0.19 0.24 
45 2.83 3.17 3.83  0.17 0.19 0.23 
48 2.81 3.13 3.75  0.17 0.19 0.23 
 
 
 
 
